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The title of this book will surely pique the interest of political philosophen 
who have spent much time and energy in recent decades trying to capture 
the idea of justice. Margalit believes that in the quest for justice, decency ha5 
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been overlooked. A decent society mayor may not be a step to ajust society, 
but decency is not a lesser concept and raises important issues on its own. 
A society is decent, according to Margalit, when its institutions do not 
humiliate people. Institutions humiliate when they give a person sound reason 
to consider his or her self-respect injured. Margalit puts forward three types 
of humiliation. One is treating humans as if they were not humans, but "as 
machines, beasts, or subhuman." The second is taking away a person's control 
over important elements of her life. The third is rejection of or by the group 
one identifies with (what Margalit calls an "encompassing group"). Since group 
membership is expressive of humanity, this is also rejection of a person from 
the human "family." 
When institutions humiliate in these ways, a person is not respected as a 
person, and, as a result, their self-respect is injured. Margalit puts forth three 
strategies for defending the Kantian notion that everyone deserves respect as 
a person: a "positive" one that appeals to a trait common and unique to 
humans; a "skeptical" one that grounds respect, not on a common trait, but 
because in our way of life we do in fact respect each other; and a "negative" 
one that gives up any attempt to justify respect but sees humiliation as wrong 
because it is cruelty-mental cruelty. 
Margalit's defense is problematic. The third strategy does not try to justify 
respect, and the second raises questions of relativism: are people unentitled 
to respect if their form of life does not respect them? Only the first of the 
three strategies seriously tries to justify respect, but the trait Margalit picks, 
"radical freedom," is open to a number of objections. I do not think, however, 
that this matters much. Margalit could use the concepts of respect and self-
respect without having to justify the principle of respect, since one can use a 
principle to illuminate a topic, even if a successful defense of the principle 
requires a different occasion. Further, the strength of the book, in my view, 
is not in its abstract account of concepts like humiliation and respect, but in 
the discussions of whether particular actions and conditions humiliate. Here 
are two of many examples: 
Culture. The culture of a decent society must be nonhumiliating. But what 
about the use of stereotypes in art, for example, Shylock, which may humiliate 
Jews. Can a decent society allow this? If not, may it censor? If we say it may 
not censor, that seems to show that decency is too high a price to pay for 
certain valuable things. Margalit's response is to distinguish between a decent 
and a civilized society. A society is decent when its institutions do not humiliate; 
a society is civilized when its people do not humiliate each other. Thus, in a 
decent society, institutions do not humiliate, but individuals might. Humiliat-
ing images and symbols are protected so long as the state does not officially 
embrace or subsidize them. This response is sensible, but it seems to require 
that the state, through an agency like the National Endowment for the Arts, 
deny support to high-value, but humiliating, art. Is it wise to put a nonhumilia-
tion condition on state subsidization? 
The welfare state. Margalit argues that poverty is humiliating. Those who 
are poor lose the ability to satisfy basic human aims, such as providing adequate 
nourishment or shelter for their children. Poveny closes off one's life options 
and is seen by both the poor and others as failure as a human being. It is 
humiliating in the loss of control and the lesser humanity it implies. There 
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are two possible responses, charity or entitlement. Margalit argues that the 
"charity society" is also humiliating. It is based on pity. It typically involves a 
sense of superiority in the giver and the expectation of gratitude from tl:.e 
receiver. This humiliates, especially when poverty is beyond one's control. 
The welfare state is preferable because it makes assistance a matter of entitle-
ment. The welfare state may be humiliating in practice (e.g., through assist-
ance from rude bureaucrats), but Margalit argues that this is not essential to 
it. It is less humiliating than charity since it protects control and need not 
imply the stigma of second-class citizenship. 
Margalit also discusses citizenship, snobbery, privacy, bureaucracy, unem-
ployment, punishment, military training rites, and concepts such as right:>, 
dignity, integrity, honor, self-esteem, servility, cruelty, and more. The discu!i-
sions throughout contain insightful remarks which could be developed CIt 
length. 
What, finally, is the relation between decency and justice? Margalit use's 
Rawls's two principles and argues that on Rawls's theory it seems possible that 
ajust society could fail to be a decent one. A society that involves a (Rawlsian) 
fair distribution of goods may give these out in a humiliating way. It may also 
humiliate nonmembers under its jurisdiction, and its encompassing groups 
may humiliate their own members. These make the society nondecent, and 
thus it appears a society could bejust but not decent. The appearance, Margalit 
says, is deceiving, since a Rawlsian theory requires a fair distribution of the 
bases of self-respect, and that means the rejection of such humiliation. So 
justice, after all, requires decency. Is decency a step on the road to justice? It 
seems that it would be since you can't have justice without decency. Margalit., 
however, suggests that a strategy for achieving a decent society may differ 
from a strategy for achieving a just society. We may need to choose between 
a lower probability of achieving justice and a higher probability of achieving 
decency. For this reason, we should take decency more seriously than we have. 
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